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SULFIDE MINING IN NORTHERN MINNESOTA: A REVIEW OF POSSIBLE 
LEGAL RECOURSE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HARM TO INDIVIDUALS 
 
By: Jamison L. Tessneer 
 
 
I. Background  
 
Minnesota has an extensive history of mining. Beginning in the nineteenth century, mining in Minnesota 
focused on limestone and to a limited extent, gold.1 However, Minnesota is predominantly known for its 
iron ore mining.2 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, three iron ranges in northern Minnesota 
became the underpinning of a mining economy that would provide hundreds of jobs and tons of iron ore to 
be processed into steel.3 
 
During this mining boom, the Mesabi Range, the largest in Minnesota, produced approximately sixty 
percent of the nation’s iron ore.4 By the middle of the twentieth century, the supply of iron ore began to 
decline.5 Researchers at the University of Minnesota developed a process in which low grade iron ore, 
known as taconite, could be compressed into pellets and used to make steel.6 Today, taconite mining 
continues in northern Minnesota, albeit on a much smaller scale.7 
 
Recently, there has been a renewed interest in mining in the region. There have been several multinational 
mining companies conducting mineral exploration projects in northern Minnesota and there are currently 
two major mining projects that have been proposed. The Northmet Project, which was proposed by Polymet 
Mining Corporation, has already begun the State of Minnesota’s permitting process. The proposed 
“Northmet Project” is different and potentially more destructive than the traditional iron ore mines familiar 
to northern Minnesota. This proposed mine would focus on extracting sulfide-bearing ore which would 
then be finished into copper, nickel, and cobalt.8 The sulfide mine proposal includes mineral processing of 
approximately 228 million tons of copper-nickel-platinum group over the next twenty years.9 The location 
                                                     
1 History of the Iron Range, Iron Range Resources. & Rehabilitation Bd., http://mn.gov/irrrb/DataCenter/history-
iron-range.jsp (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 
2 Id. 
 
3 Id. 
 
4 Id. 
 
5 Id. 
 
6 Id. 
 
7 Id. 
 
8 Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res., Northmet Project Draft Environmental Impact Statement 1 (2009), available at 
http://files.dnr.state.mn.us/input/environmentalreview/polymet/draft_eis/summary_document.pdf. 
 
9 Id. at 6. 
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of the Northmet Project is between Babbitt and Hoyt Lakes, Minnesota, within the boundaries of the 
Superior National Forest.10 
 
A second project has been proposed by Twin Metals Minnesota LLC, and this project is expected to be the 
largest underground mine in Minnesota history.11 The mining operation site that has been proposed is just 
a few miles from the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness. Twin Metals Minnesota LLC plans to begin 
the permitting process in 2014.12 These two projects represent the beginning of what some expect to be a 
new wave of mining in northeastern Minnesota. 
 
Support for the proposed mines exists primarily because of the potential to create desperately needed jobs 
and economic stimulation in the region, but there is also public concern over the impact these mines could 
have on northern Minnesota’s natural environment. One major concern is that sulfide waste rock contains 
heavy metals such as arsenic, cadmium, chromium, copper, lead, nickel, silver and zinc.13 When sulfide 
waste rock is exposed to rain and snow, these metals leach into surface water and groundwater.14 According 
to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “[t]he resulting fluids may be highly toxic and, when mixed 
with groundwater, surface water and soil, may have harmful effects on humans, animals and plants.”15 This 
leaching is commonly known as acid mine drainage.16 The EPA states that acid mine drainage “disrupts the 
growth and reproduction of aquatic plants and animals, diminishes valued recreational fish species, 
degrades outdoor recreation and tourism, contaminates surface and groundwater drinking supplies, and 
causes acid corrosion of infrastructure like wastewater pipes.”17 
 
For example, the Gilt Edge Mine, a mine in South Dakota similar to the proposed mines in Minnesota, is a 
designated superfund site that requires constant monitoring by the EPA.18 According to the EPA, the mine 
is contaminating the Strawberry and Bear Butte Creeks with cadmium, copper, and zinc.19 Currently, the 
Gilt Edge mine does not pose an immediate threat to human health.20 If the site was not controlled, the large 
                                                     
 
10 Id. at 1 
 
11 John Myers, Underground Mine Near Ely Would Be Largest in Minnesota, Pioneer Press (Mar. 27, 2012, 10:21 
AM), http://www.twincities.com/ci_20264298/underground-mine-near-ely-would-be-largest-minnesota. 
 
12 Id. 
 
13 Gilt Edge Mine, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, http://www2.epa.gov/region8/gilt-edge-mine (last visited Apr. 26, 
2014) [hereinafter Gilt Edge Mine]. 
 
14 Id. 
 
15 Abandoned Mine Drainage, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/nps/acid_mine.cfm (last 
visited Mar. 27, 2014). 
 
16 Id. 
 
17 Mining Operations as Nonpoint Source Pollution, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, 
http://www.epa.gov/reg3wapd/nps/mining.html?tab=2 (last visited Mar. 27, 2014). 
 
18 Gilt Edge Mine, supra note 13. 
 
19 Id. 
 
20 Id. 
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volumes of contaminated water could threaten well-water supplies of people living up and down stream.21 
Likewise, fourteen years after the Flambeau Mine near Ladysmith, Wisconsin ended its operations, its water 
continues to contain zinc and copper in excess of state toxicity standards for surface waters. 22  This 
contamination potentially threatens fish and aquatic life in the area.23 There are similar mines in New 
Mexico, Nevada, and Montana. 
 
In Minnesota, there are hundreds of outfitters, resorts, homeowners, restaurants, lodges, and other 
businesses that surround the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness, Lake Superior, and the Superior 
National Forest. These landowners rely heavily on the pristine wilderness of northern Minnesota for the 
value of their businesses and their land. The contamination of public and private land and water from similar 
mines in other states should lead people in Minnesota to consider whether current Minnesota law adequately 
protects them from potential harm to their land, their livelihood, and their families if these sulfide mining 
projects become a reality. Landowners in northern Minnesota could consider state law, federal law, and 
common law causes of action to either stop the mines before they begin, stop them once they have caused 
damage, collect monetary damages for damage to their property, or a combination of these relief options.
 
 
II. State Law 
 
Minnesota is one of a few states that have established a private statutory cause of action for harm to the 
natural environment.24 The Minnesota Environmental Rights Act (MERA) was passed in 1971.25 It states 
that “it is in the public interest to provide an adequate civil remedy to protect air, water, land, and other 
natural resources located within the state from pollution, impairment, and destruction.” 26  The statute 
provides declaratory relief, temporary and permanent equitable relief, and may impose conditions on a party 
that are necessary to protect the environment.27 
 
There are five main components of the statute that must be examined when considering the causes of action 
landowners in northern Minnesota might have against sulfide mining companies responsible for damage to 
the landowners’ property. It must first be determined whether the landowners would fall under the statute’s 
definition of a person.28 Second, it must be determined whether the land or property in question meets the 
                                                     
 
21 Id. 
 
22 Lee Bergquist, Tests Find Toxins at Flambeau Mine, Milwaukee J. Sentinel (Nov. 1, 2011), 
http://www.jsonline.com/news/wisconsin/tests-find-toxins-at-flambeau-mine-133051073.html. 
 
23 Id. 
 
24 Andrew J. Piela, A Tale of Two Statutes: Twenty Year Judicial Interpretation of the Citizen Suit Provision in the 
Connecticut Environmental Protection Act and the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, 21 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 
401 (1994). 
 
25 Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, ch. 952, 1971 Minn. Laws 2011 (codified as amended at Minn. Stat. §§ 
116B.01–.13 (2013)). 
 
26 § 116B.01. 
 
27 Id. § 116B.07. 
 
28 Id. § 116B.02, subdiv. 2. 
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statute’s definition of natural resource.29 Third, it must be determined if the potential harm that sulfide 
mines pose to the land and water is the particular type of harm that the statute is meant to protect against.30 
Next, the landowners need to consider the defenses that the mining companies would potentially have 
against a prima facie case under MERA.31 Finally, landowners would need to consider whether there would 
be any exemptions for those against whom they could bring a cause of action.32 There is an expansive 
number of cases in Minnesota that outline the scope and limitations of MERA. When read in conjunction 
with the plain language of the statute, these cases help illustrate the strengths and potential shortcomings 
that the statute may have in protecting private landowners from potential harm from sulfide mines. 
 
A. Statutory Definitions 
 
The statute broadly defines what it means to be a person in order to bring a cause of action.33 The statute 
defines a person as “any natural person, any state, municipality or other governmental or political 
subdivision or other public agency or instrumentality, any public or private corporation, any partnership, 
firm, association, or other organization, any receiver, trustee, assignee, agent, or other legal representative 
of any of the foregoing, and any other entity.”34 The statute provides an exception to family farms, family 
farm corporations, and bona fide farmer corporations.35 The statute also broadly defines natural resources 
to include mineral, animal, botanical, air, water, land, timber, soil, quietude, recreational and historical 
resources, as well as scenic and aesthetic resources when owned by a government unit or agency. 36 
 
The statute broadly defines what is considered pollution, impairment, or destruction. Subdivision five of 
the statute includes any conduct that: 
[V]iolates, or is likely to violate, any environmental quality standard, limitation, rule, order, license, 
stipulation agreement, or permit of the state or any instrumentality, agency, or political subdivision thereof 
which was issued prior to the date the alleged violation occurred or is likely to occur or any conduct which 
materially adversely affects or is likely to materially adversely affect the environment37 
The language focuses on conduct that violates a codified rule as the way to determine pollution, impairment, 
or destruction of the environment. However, the statute also leaves discretion when determining whether 
additional conduct is pollution, impairment, or destruction of the environment by using the ambiguous 
                                                     
 
29 Id. § 116B.02, subdiv. 4. 
 
30 Id. § 116B.02, subdiv. 5. 
 
31 See Cnty. of Freeborn ex rel Tuveson v. Bryson, 210 N.W.2d 290, 297 (Minn. 1973). 
 
32 § 116B.03, subdiv. 1. 
 
33 Id. § 116B.02, subdiv. 2. 
 
34 Id. 
 
35 Id. 
 
36 Id. § 116B.02, subdiv. 4. 
 
37 Id. § 116B.02, subdiv. 5. 
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language, “or any conduct which materially adversely affects or is likely to adversely affect the 
environment.”38 The language of the statute must be applied to real situations in order to understand how 
the courts have interpreted the law. 
 
B. Establishing a Cause of Action 
 
In Freeborn County v. Bryson, the court established a two-prong test to establish a prima facie cause of 
action under MERA.39 The plaintiff must first establish a protectable natural resource, and second, establish 
pollution, impairment, or destruction of that resource.40 In this case, farmers whose land was condemned 
by the county in order to construct a new highway successfully showed that the highway would adversely 
affect a natural marsh.41 The court found that the highway would divide the natural marsh, the natural marsh 
was an ecological unit, the construction would eliminate some of the natural physical assets, the highway’s 
high speed would increase animal fatalities, and the highway would disturb the quietness and the solitude 
of the marsh.42 
 
One of the difficulties in these causes of actions can be establishing harm. Minnesota Public Interest 
Research Group v. White Bear Rod and Gun Club43 is one of the seminal cases in Minnesota that established 
the means the plaintiff has to prove harm to the environment. In this case, a nonprofit organization sought 
declaratory and injunctive relief under MERA because the operation of a trap-and-skeet shooting facility 
would adversely affect the environment.44 The proposed site of the trap-and-skeet shooting facility included 
a lake that provided shelter and food to migratory waterfowl. The facility threatened deer, muskrat, fox, 
porcupines, raccoons, badgers, and other animals that lived in the woods and wetlands surrounding the 
lake.45 The case established two means a plaintiff has to prove harm under MERA.46 
 
First, the court states that the plaintiff can prove “that the conduct in question violates, or may violate, any 
environmental quality standard, rule, or regulation of the state or any political subdivision thereof.”47 The 
                                                     
 
38 Id. 
 
39 Cnty. of Freeborn ex rel Tuveson v. Bryson, 210 N.W.2d 290, 297 (Minn. 1973). 
 
40 Id. 
 
41 Id. 
 
42 Id. 
 
43 257 N.W.2d 762 (Minn. 1977). 
 
44 Id. at 764. 
 
45 Id. at 765. 
 
46 Id. at 768. 
 
47 Id. 
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plaintiff in this case did not attempt to show that the facility violated any rules or standards.48 The plaintiff 
instead relied on the second means the court identified in MERA to prove harm.49 
 
The court stated that the plaintiff could prove “that the conduct complained of materially, adversely affects 
or is likely to affect the environment.”50 The plaintiffs claimed that the trap-and-skeet shooting facility 
would destroy the quietude of the area.51 In addition, the plaintiff also claimed that the lead shot deposits 
in the surrounding wetlands would cause destruction to wildlife.52 Because quietude and wildlife fall under 
the statute’s definition of a natural resource and the plaintiff was able to show adverse effect to the 
environment, the statute applied.53 
 
The court further clarified how to interpret the language of “adversely affecting the environment” in State 
ex rel. Wacouta Township v. Brunkow Hardwood Corp.54 In that case the court established a four-part test 
to determine whether conduct would adversely affect the environment.55 First, the court must determine 
whether the natural resource involved is rare, endangered, or has historical significance.56 Second, the court 
must determine whether the resource in question is easily replaceable.57 Third, the court must decide if the 
proposed conduct will have a significant consequential effect on other natural resources.58 Finally, the court 
must decide whether the direct or consequential impact will affect a critical number of the wildlife 
affected.59 
 
These cases established the basic rules for bringing a prima facie cause of action under MERA. First, the 
plaintiff must demonstrate that the resource is a protectable natural resource within the broad definition of 
the statue. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate pollution, impairment, or destruction of that resource. 
Harm can then be shown by either a violation of a codified rule, standard, or regulation, or by a more 
discretionary test of showing that the conduct in question adversely affects, or will adversely affect, the 
protectable natural resource. 
 
                                                     
 
48 Id. 
 
49 Id. 
 
50 Id. 
 
51 Id. 
 
52 Id. 
 
53 Id. at 770; see also Minn. Stat. § 116B.02, subdiv. 4 (2013). 
 
54 510 N.W.2d 27 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). 
 
55 Id. at 31. 
 
56 Id. at 30. 
 
57 Id. 
 
58 Id.  
 
59 Id. 
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C. Defenses 
 
MERA sets out a balancing test to weigh potential economic benefits and public necessity with harm or 
potential harm to the environment. Section 116B.04 of the statute provides the defendants in an action the 
opportunity to rebut the plaintiff’s prima facie case establishing the defendant’s conduct will cause or is 
likely to cause harm to the environment.60 It allows the defendant to submit evidence contrary to the 
plaintiff’s evidence establishing harm.61 In Wacouta, a logging operation was enjoined because it was 
discovered that the site for the operation was the largest bald eagle nesting site in the state.62 The court 
determined that the defendant failed to rebut any of the evidence presented by the biologists. 63 
 
In addition, under section 116B.04 of MERA, the statute also allows the defendant to show, as an 
affirmative defense, that there is no feasible or prudent alternative and that the conduct at issue is consistent 
with the promotion of public health, safety, and welfare of the state’s interest in protecting the 
environment.64 Again, in Wacouta, the court determined that the defendant failed to show any “evidence 
that the enjoined conduct will promote the public health, safety, or welfare in any noneconomic fashion.”65 
In State ex rel Achabal v. County of Hennepin, the court determined that there is “an extremely high standard 
for defendants to meet in establishing an affirmative defense” under MERA.66 
 
Finally, section 116B.04 of MERA expressly prohibits economic considerations as the sole defense under 
this section.67  In State ex rel Drabik v. Martz, the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld a temporary 
injunction for construction of a radio tower because it would be in view of the Boundary Waters Canoe 
Area Wilderness and state park land.68 The defendant argued that the planned project would contribute 
capital and jobs to the local economy.69  The court, citing section 116B.04 of MERA, explained that 
economic considerations alone were not superior to the state’s interest in protecting the natural 
environment.70 
 
                                                     
 
60 Minn. Stat. § 116B.04 (2013). 
 
61 Id. 
 
62 Wacouta, 510 N.W.2d at 31. 
 
63 Id. 
 
64 § 116B.04. 
 
65 Wacouta, 510 N.W.2d at 31. 
 
66 State ex rel Archabal v. Cnty. of Hennepin, 495 N.W.2d 416, 423 (Minn. 1993). 
 
67 § 116B.04. 
 
68 State ex rel Drabik v. Martz, 451 N.W.2d 893, 896–97 (Minn. 1990). 
 
69 Id. at 897. 
 
70 Id. 
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D. Exemptions 
 
Conduct that has undergone the permitting process and been permitted by the Pollution Control Agency, 
the Department of Natural Resources, the Department of Health, or the Department of Agriculture is exempt 
from civil actions under MERA.71 The statute states in relevant part, “no action shall be allowable under 
this section for conduct taken by a person pursuant to any environmental quality standard, limitation, rule, 
order, license, stipulation agreement or permit issued by the Pollution Control Agency, Department of 
Natural Resources, Department of Health or Department of Agriculture.” 72  Both Polymet Mining 
Corporation and Twin Metals Minnesota LLC are pursuing permits through the Department of Natural 
Resources. Polymet’s Northmet Project has already completed a Draft Environmental Impact Statement 
and completed a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement. Twin Metals Minnesota LLC is working 
to complete a Draft Environmental Impact Statement in 2014 for its proposed project near the Boundary 
Waters Canoe Area Wilderness.73 If these mining projects are given a permit to operate by the appropriate 
state agency, then landowners whose land has been harmed by the sulfide mines will be unable to file a 
cause of action against the mining companies. 
 
E. Analysis 
 
It could be said that MERA would sufficiently protect landowners in northern Minnesota from any potential 
damage that could occur to their land if the new sulfide mining operations began. The landowners would 
fall under the broad definition of persons defined in section 116B.02. 74  In addition, the landowners’ 
property would likely fall under the statute’s broad definition of natural resources.75 The issue of harm 
requires a more complicated analysis. 
 
If the harm that has occurred in other states with similar mines occurred to the land and water belonging to 
the landowners in northern Minnesota, the landowners would likely be able to demonstrate harm. With 
proper expert testimony, the landowners could show that the acid mine drainage would likely violate rules 
and standards for land and water pollution designated by the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, 
Department of Natural Resources, or other state or local law. 
 
The potential harm to the land could also fall within the discretionary scope of conduct that materially 
adversely affects the environment. Under the four-part test in Wacouta, the landowners would likely be 
able to show that the wilderness area in northern Minnesota is rare because the Boundary Waters Canoe 
Area Wilderness contains more than 1 million acres of primitive wilderness, 1,200 miles of canoe routes, 
and more than 2,000 designated campsites.76 It is likely that they would also be able to show that the 
                                                     
 
71 § 116B.03, subdiv. 1. 
 
72 Id.  
 
73 Project Schedule, Twin Metals Minn., http://www.twin-metals.com/about-the-project/project-schedule/ (last 
visited on May 19, 2014). 
 
74 § 116B.02, subdiv. 2. 
 
75 Id. § 116B.02, subdiv. 4. 
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wilderness in Northern Minnesota is not easily replaceable by providing examples of the effects sulfide 
mining has had on other natural areas and their continued contamination. With the help of biologists, 
ecologists, and other experts, it is likely that the landowners would also be able to demonstrate that the 
sulfide mines would have a consequential affect on other natural resources and that it would be a critical 
amount. 
 
It is likely that the landowners would be able to sufficiently demonstrate that their land is a natural resource 
and that there will be harm. That harm will be determined either by violating a standard or regulation, or 
through the Wacouta test. It seems unlikely that the mining companies would be able to rebut the evidence 
based on the effects sulfide mining has had in other states. It also seems unlikely that the mining companies 
would be able to show how the sulfide mines promote public health, safety, and welfare beyond an 
economic interest. There remains concern, however, that if these mines are permitted by the State of 
Minnesota, they will be exempt from a cause of action under MERA. 
 
The language of the statute does contain a section that allows for civil actions to be maintained against the 
state or agency that sets environmental standards or promulgates permits for conduct that would be subject 
to the statute. Section 116B.10 states in relevant part: 
 
[A]ny natural person residing within the state; the attorney general; any political subdivision of the state; 
any instrumentality or agency of the state or of a political subdivision thereof; or any partnership, 
corporation, association, organization, or other legal entity having shareholders, members, partners or 
employees residing within the state may maintain a civil action in the district court for declaratory or 
equitable relief against the state or any agency or instrumentality thereof where the nature of the action is a 
challenge to an environmental quality standard, limitation, rule, order, license, stipulation agreement, or 
permit promulgated or issued by the state or any agency or instrumentality thereof for which the applicable 
statutory appeal period has elapsed.77 
 
This section of Chapter 116B allows private landowners to file suit against the State of Minnesota or the 
Department of Natural Resources. In order to maintain this action, the landowners would have the burden 
of proving that permits issued by the Department of Natural Resources were inadequate in protecting the 
environment from the sulfide mines.78 
 
Furthermore, the statute contains language that would allow private landowners to intervene in the 
permitting process. In relevant part, section 116B.09 states that any natural person residing in the state 
“shall be permitted to intervene as a party upon the filing of a verified pleading asserting that the proceeding 
or action for judicial review involves conduct that has caused or is likely to cause pollution, impairment, or 
destruction of the air, water, land or other natural resources located within the state.”79 The statute also 
requires that the agency consider the “alleged impairment, pollution, or destruction of the air, water, land, 
or other natural resources located within the state,” and that any conduct that negatively affects the 
environment is prohibited so long as there is a reasonably prudent alternative.80 In application, the court in 
                                                     
76 The Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness, U.S. Forest Service, 
http://www.fs.usda.gov/detail/superior/specialplaces/?cid=stelprdb5202169 
 
77 § 116B.10, subdiv. 1. 
 
78 Id. § 116B.10, subdiv. 2. 
 
79 Id. § 116B.09, subdiv. 1. 
 
80 Id. § 116B.09, subdiv. 2. 
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Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst81 determined that the agency erroneously concluded that a second tailings 
disposal site in a national forest was reasonable and prudent when the evidence demonstrated that the impact 
on natural resources would not be significantly different than the site initially proposed. Finally, section 
116B.09 continues to maintain that economic considerations alone are not sufficient in order to justify the 
conduct that would adversely affect the environment.82 
 
Overall, the statute is relatively strong with regard to allowing for private causes of action to protect the 
environment in Minnesota. On the issue of sulfide mines and other large scale projects that will almost 
certainly seek permitting from state agencies, the law would be more effective in giving landowners a cause 
of action if the language in section 116B.03, exempting permitted projects, was excluded. Absent that, if 
the sulfide mines are permitted, then the landowners could work together with local governments and local 
organizations to bring a cause of action against the state agencies. However, if that cause of action occurs 
after the mines are in operation and the damage to the landowners’ property has already transpired, then the 
state agencies and state government are not the “deep pocket” that can provide the landowners with the 
equitable relief that they would likely be seeking. 
 
 
III. Federal Law
 
 
There are three major federal laws that allow citizens to bring private suits against polluters, which can 
result in penalties.83 These federal laws do not allow the plaintiffs to receive compensation for damage to 
their property. In cases involving water pollution and solid waste, the penalty awards go to the federal 
treasury.84 In cases involving air pollution, the court has the discretion to award some of the money to a 
mitigation project at the recommendation of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, but the rest of the 
money then goes to the treasury.85 Because these federal laws do not directly benefit landowners in northern 
Minnesota through compensation for damages, they should briefly be examined as a possible way to enjoin 
mining activities and as additional penalties that the government could impose on the mining companies. 
 
A. Clean Water Act 
 
Under 33 U.S.C. § 1365, any citizen has the ability to pursue a cause of action against any person, including 
the U.S. government or relevant agency or entity, for violation of a standard or limitation of the Clean Water 
Act.86 In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Watkins,87 the court determined that in order to have 
standing for redress of environmental harm, the plaintiffs need not show that absent the defendant’s 
                                                     
 
81 256 N.W.2d 808 (Minn. 1977). 
 
82 § 116B.09, subdiv. 2. 
 
83 1 James T. O’Reilly, Toxic Torts Prac. Guide § 10:6 (2013). 
 
84 Id. 
 
85 Id. 
 
86 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(a) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-92). 
 
87 954 F.2d 974, 980 (4th Cir. 1992). 
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conduct, the plaintiffs would enjoy an undisturbed use of their land. Under the language of the statute and 
the application in Watkins, it is likely that the landowners who are negatively affected by the sulfide mines 
would have the ability to file a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act. Despite the federal law’s inability to 
provide compensatory relief for the potential damage to the plaintiff’s land, the law can provide injunctive 
relief which would halt the operation of the sulfide mines. 
 
B. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
 
This area of federal law is focused largely on managing hazardous waste and ensuring that the waste is 
properly stored. Similar to the provisions outlined in the Clean Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 broadly allows 
any citizen to bring suit against anyone, including the United States government, “who is alleged to be in 
violation of any permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order which has 
become effective pursuant to this chapter.”88  In applying this statute, the court in Aiello v. Town of 
Brookhaven,89 the district court for the Eastern District of New York determined that the environmental and 
health interests of people in the general vicinity of a landfill had sufficient standing to bring a citizen suit 
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). On the issue of relief, the court can require a 
polluter to cleanup and dispose of toxic waste properly. In City of Waukesha v. Viacom International Inc., 
90 the court determined that “[u]nder RCRA, a citizen may seek a mandatory injunction that orders a 
responsible party to take action by attending to the cleanup and proper disposal of toxic waste.” 
 
The landowners in northern Minnesota that are in the vicinity would meet the standard discussed in Aiello 
v. Town of Brookhaven91 and therefore have the ability to bring a cause of action. Under the ruling in City 
of Waukesha v. Viacom International Inc., the landowners could seek similar relief in requiring mining 
companies to clean up the acid mine drainage leached from their mining operations and to properly dispose 
of waste rock from the mine.92 
 
C. Clean Air Act 
 
In Covington v. Jefferson County,93 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that landowners who 
lived near a county landfill had Article III standing in order to bring a citizen suit under the Clean Air Act 
as long as the landowners could show injury-in-fact that landowners feared that contamination from the 
landfill would diminish their enjoyment of their property. Although the citizen suits under the Clean Air 
Act cannot provide compensatory damages, in Sierra Club v. Franklin County Power of Illinois, L.L.C.,94 
                                                     
 
88 42 U.S.C.A. § 6972(a)(1)(A) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-92). 
 
89 136 F. Supp. 2d 81, 106 (E.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 
90 362 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1029 (E.D. Wis. 2005). 
 
91 Aiello, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 105-106. 
 
92 Viacom, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 1029. 
 
93 358 F.3d 626, 638 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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the court issued an injunction on the construction of a new coal-fired power plant based on the citizen suit 
filed by the nonprofit organization. 
 
Based on the outcomes of sulfide mining in other states, most of the focus on damage to the environment 
has centered on water and wildlife. However, in the case that there are violations of the Clean Air Act, the 
landowners would likely have standing to bring suit. Despite the inability of the federal law to provide 
compensatory damages for the landowners, the Clean Air Act does have the ability to enjoin the mining 
operations if the mining activities violate standards set forth in the law.95 
 
 
IV. Common Law Causes of Action
 
 
Common law causes of action regarding exposure to chemicals or damage to property from an industrial 
site has become its own area of law known as toxic torts.96 Toxic torts typically involve common law causes 
of actions including trespass, nuisance, negligence, negligence per se, strict liability, intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, and in some cases, assault and battery.97 Routinely, one or more of these causes of 
actions will be brought in the same suit and are often coupled with statutory causes of action from the state 
and federal level. While many of these causes of action may be applicable to landowners in northern 
Minnesota, trespass and nuisance are the most pertinent. 
 
There are a number of common obstacles associated with toxic tort causes of action. First, the plaintiff must 
prove that the defendant met the requisite liability standard.98 Second, the plaintiff must establish a link 
between the defendant and the release of the substance.99 Third, the plaintiff must establish that the chemical 
can cause the harm the plaintiff suffers.100 Finally, the plaintiff must establish that the harm experienced is 
a result of exposure to the chemical.101 Toxic tort causes of action must be viewed with these complexities 
in mind in order to adequately analyze the sufficiency of the law’s ability to protect or compensate 
landowners. 
 
A. Trespass 
 
The tort of trespass includes three mainstay elements. First, the landowner must have a legal interest in the 
property or a possessory interest. Second, the tort of trespass requires intent. Finally, synonymous with all 
torts, trespass requires the element of legally cognizable harm. Trespass causes of actions can have a variety 
                                                     
94 546 F.3d 918, 936 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 
95 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413 (West 2013). 
 
96 20A1 Brent A. Olson, Minnesota Practice series: Business Law Deskbook § 25:7 (2013). 
 
97 Id. § 25:8. 
 
98 Daniel A. Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 Minn. L. Rev. 1219, 1222 (1987). 
 
99 Id. at 1225. 
 
100 Id. at 1227. 
 
101 Id. at 1228. 
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of forms of relief including monetary damages, injunctive relief, and punitive damages. While the element 
of possessory interest is relatively straightforward, the elements of intent and harm should be more carefully 
examined to determine how they apply to landowners who could be negatively impacted by sulfide mines. 
 
Modern trespass theory encompasses both intentional and unintentional or negligent physical invasion of 
another person’s property.102 Intentional trespass is when the defendant knows that its conduct is likely to 
result in harm to the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s property or is substantially certain the harm will occur.103 
Unintentional trespass is usually rooted in negligence. Unintentional trespass is when the defendant has 
reason to know that its conduct is likely to result in harm to the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s property.104 Having 
the knowledge that an industrial site is leaching toxic chemicals and having the knowledge that the toxic 
chemicals are leaching into the groundwater of the adjacent property is generally enough to show intent.105 
 
Typically, harm is required in a cause of action for trespass, but it is possible to succeed in a cause of action 
for trespass without showing harm. Generally, if the trespass action does not include harm, the damages 
will only be nominal. 106  Damages can be measured in a variety of ways, but the harm cannot be 
speculative.107 Most jurisdictions divide harm into temporary harm and permanent harm.108 Temporary 
harm occurs when the defendant’s tortious activity is ongoing with recurring instances of harm to the 
landowner’s property.109 Each instance is a separate recoverable action.110 Permanent harm occurs when 
the defendant’s conduct causes irreparable harm to the plaintiff’s property. 111  Permanent harms are 
recoverable for damages past, present, and prospective.112 Because of the loss of property market value, 
some courts have also awarded stigma damages when there is permanent damage to a property.113 Stigma 
damages are awarded to compensate a plaintiff whose property begins to have a negative public perception 
resulting from the pollution or contamination.114 
 
Courts tend to limit damages in cases of temporary harm to the cost to repair or restore the property after 
the damage and damages for any loss of use of the property during the temporary harm. Courts limit 
                                                     
 
102 Olson, supra note 102, § 25:2. 
 
103 O’Reilly, supra note 83, § 6:8. 
 
104 Id. 
 
105 Id. 
 
106 Id. 
 
107 See Olson, supra note 102. 
 
108 Id. 
 
109 Id. 
 
110 Id. 
 
111 Id. 
 
112 Id. 
 
113 See O’Reilly, supra note 83, § 6:8. 
 
114 Olson, supra note 102, § 25:10. 
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damages for permanent harm to the loss in market value or the diminution in the value of the property. 
Generally, most courts do not award stigma damages and if a court does award stigma damages, there must 
be physical harm from the contamination to the property.115 
 
Under this trespass framework, landowners in northern Minnesota could file a trespass cause of action 
against sulfide mining companies if, for example, acid mine drainage from one of the mines leaked into the 
landowner’s groundwater causing it to be contaminated. The landowner would certainly have a possessory 
interest in the property. The landowner would likely be able to show unintentional trespass embedded in a 
theory of negligence. The landowner might also be able to show intentional trespass if it can show that the 
mining company had knowledge that similar mines in other states have caused the same type of 
contamination. Furthermore, the landowner may be able to show that the mining company’s conduct is 
abnormally dangerous and that can qualify as an unintentional trespass action as well. The landowner may 
be able to show temporary harm which could result in getting the mining activities enjoined, forcing the 
mining company to repair the landowner’s property, compensating the landowner for the damage, or any 
combination of these types of relief. The landowner may be able to show permanent trespass resulting in 
some or all of the previous types of relief and could also result in punitive damages. 
 
The overarching problems associated with toxic torts apply to the tort of trespass as well. The standard of 
liability is a relatively easy burden to meet in a trespass case. If the defendant’s substance invades the 
property of the plaintiff then the defendant is liable. However, it might be difficult to determine if the 
substance on plaintiff’s land came from the defendant. Expert testimony would be required to show, for 
example, that absent the mining operations there would not be an elevated level of sulfuric acid in the 
plaintiff’s groundwater. It also might be difficult to establish that the harm experienced by the plaintiff is a 
result of the sulfide mines. Again, expert testimony would be required to show, for example, that acid mine 
drainage killed aquatic insects in a lake near the mining operation and that that aquatic insect was the 
primary food for a species of migratory birds whose population has now dramatically decreased. Case law 
can help demonstrate how trespass, as it relates to toxic torts, is applied in Minnesota and how it potentially 
could be applied in Minnesota. 
 
In Citizens for a Safe Grant v. Lone Oak Sportsmen's Club, Inc.,116 a neighborhood organization brought a 
suit against a gun club alleging trespass among other causes of actions. The Minnesota Court of Appeals 
stated, “Trespass encompasses any unlawful interference with one's person, property, or rights, and requires 
only two essential elements: a rightful possession in the plaintiff and unlawful entry upon such possession 
by the defendant.”117 The court further stated that trespass is not limited to human interference and can 
occur when someone places an object on another person’s property.118 The court concluded that the entry 
of bullets onto the property of another person without the property owner’s permission constitutes 
trespass.119 
 
In an action against 3M, plaintiffs alleged that perfluorooctane sulfonate (PFOS) and perfluorooctanoic acid 
                                                     
 
115 Id.  
 
116 624 N.W.2d 796 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). 
 
117 Id. at 805 (quoting Special Force Ministries v. WCCO Television, 584 N.W.2d 789, 792–93 (Minn. Ct. App.  
1998)). 
 
118 Id. 
 
119 Id. 
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(PFOA), released from 3M’s facility, landed on their property after traveling through the air, surface water, 
and ground water, and continue to remain on their property in detectable quantities.120 According to the 
U.S. EPA, PFOS and PFOA are emerging contaminants characterized as a “potential or real threat” to 
human health and the environment.121 The court rejected the defendant’s motion to dismiss the claim of 
trespass.122 
 
In contrast, in Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Co-op. Oil Co.,123 an organic farmer brought a 
trespass action against a neighboring farm. The plaintiff alleged that the neighboring farmer’s pesticide 
drifted onto the plaintiff’s property and negatively affected the plaintiff’s organic crops.124 After a lengthy 
discussion, the court concluded that the particulate matter of the pesticide was not tangible125 and further, 
that the pesticide did not interfere with the plaintiff’s exclusive possession of the land.126  The court 
determined that allowing a trespass action based on damage to property from particulate matter would blur 
the line between trespass and nuisance.127 The court maintained that landowners have a right “to exclude 
others through the ability to maintain an action in trespass even when no damages are provable.”128 The 
court concluded by saying that requiring a landowner to show damage for invasion to the landowner’s 
property before that landowner could seek redress “offends the traditional principles of ownership.”129 
 
The court’s decision in Johnson potentially limits a cause of action that a landowner affected by the acid 
mine drainage from the sulfide mines might have. The court’s opinion could be interpreted to bar a cause 
of action for trespass if the trespassing object is contaminated water and the contaminant is considered 
particulate matter. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency defines particulate matter as “a complex 
mixture of extremely small particles and liquid droplets. Particle pollution is made up of a number of 
components, including acids (such as nitrates and sulfates), organic chemicals, metals, and soil or dust 
particles.”130 Under this definition, it is possible that courts would conclude that contaminated water, such 
as acid mine drainage, exceeds the small particles and liquid droplets defining particulate matter. Under 
this interpretation, acid mine drainage could constitute trespass. 
 
The Johnson decision was the Minnesota Supreme Court’s reversal of a decision from the lower court. The 
                                                     
 
120 Palmer v. 3M Co., No. C2004-6309, 2005 WL 5891911 (Minn. Dist. Ct. April 25, 2005). 
 
121 U.S. Envtl. Prot, Agency, Emerging Contaminants—Perfluorooctane Sulfonate (PFOS) and Perfluorooctanoic 
Acid (PFOA) 1 (2012), available at http://www.epa.gov/fedfac/pdf/emerging_contaminants_pfos_pfoa.pdf. 
 
122 Palmer, 2005 WL 5891911. 
 
123 817 N.W.2d 693, 696 (Minn. 2012). 
 
124 Id. 
 
125 Id. at 702. 
 
126 Id. at 705. 
 
127 Id. at 704. 
 
128 Id. 
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130 Particulate Matter (PM), U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://www.epa.gov/pm/ (last visited April. 17, 2014). 
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Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded that trespass could occur even though particulate matter is 
intangible. The court of appeals relied on two cases outside of Minnesota. In Bradley v. American Smelting 
& Refining Co., 131  the Supreme Court of Washington concluded that a copper smelting company’s 
intentional release of arsenic and cadmium as particulate matter constituted trespass. The court stated that 
in order to give rise to a cause of action in trespass, the plaintiff must show an invasion affecting interest 
and exclusion of her property, intentional doing of the act which resulted in the invasion, it was reasonably 
foreseeable that the conduct could result in the invasion of the plaintiff’s possessory interest, and there were 
substantial damages to the plaintiff’s property.132 In Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., Inc.,133 the Supreme 
Court of Alabama applied the same test when the plaintiff sued a lead company for dangerous accumulation 
of lead particulates and sulfoxide deposits on the plaintiff’s property. 
 
Under the Minnesota Supreme Court’s contemporary view, particulate matter is intangible and therefore 
unable to give rise to a cause of action for trespass.134 It is possible that the leaching of acid mine drainage 
from sulfide mines onto another’s property would not constitute trespass under the current view. Further 
examination by the court of what exactly constitutes particulate matter is needed before this issue can be 
resolved. However, if the court were to apply the standard outlined in Bradley or Borland, then the 
landowners who have acid mine drainage on their property may have a higher likelihood of success in a 
trespass cause of action. 
 
A landowner whose property has been contaminated with acid mine drainage may be able to show that the 
contamination affected his interest and exclusive control of the property. The landowner may be able to 
show that intentionally mining for precious metals resulted in the acid mine drainage leaching onto her 
property. The landowner may also be able to show that, based on the impact of sulfide mining in other 
states, the mining company should have reasonably foreseen that the conduct would invade the landowner’s 
possessory interest in the property. Finally, providing that the acid mine drainage did contaminate 
groundwater or kill aquatic species, the landowner would be able to demonstrate damage to her property. 
Under the Minnesota Court of Appeals application of the Bradley and Borland standard, a landowner whose 
property was affected by acid mine drainage would have the ability to bring a cause of action for trespass 
to the landowner’s property. Under the current Minnesota Supreme Court’s ruling in Johnson, it is difficult 
to definitively determine whether landowners would be able to demonstrate an invasion of their possessory 
interest which is one of only two essential elements the court has identified in order to give rise to a cause 
of action in trespass. 
 
B. Nuisance 
 
Nuisance is one of the most common toxic tort causes of action. 135  It arises out of harm, injury, 
inconvenience, or annoyance from a wide variety of conduct.136 Nuisance is divided into two categories: 
                                                     
 
131 709 P.2d 782, 789 (Wash. 1985). 
 
132 Id. at 790. 
 
133 369 So. 2d 523, 527–29 (Ala. 1979). 
 
134 817 N.W.2d 693 700 (Minn. 2012). 
 
135 O’Reilly, supra note 83, § 6:4. 
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public nuisance and private nuisance. Public nuisance actions can be brought by public officials or by 
private individuals, and private nuisance actions can be brought by private individuals.137 In Minnesota, 
there are also statutory public nuisance and private nuisance causes of action. The overarching common 
law public nuisance and private nuisance causes of action, the statutory causes of action, and Minnesota 
case law must be examined and applied to the potential cause of action landowners in northern Minnesota 
may have against sulfide mining companies in order to understand the law’s ability to protect and 
compensate landowners. 
 
1. Public Nuisance 
 
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 821B, a public nuisance is an unreasonable 
interference with a right common to the general public.138 There are three main questions to consider when 
analyzing a public nuisance cause of action. First, consider whether the defendant interfered with a public 
as opposed to a private right.139 A public right is a right that is common to all members of the general 
public.140  Second, consider whether the interference was unreasonable.141  Third, consider whether the 
plaintiff seeking remedy has suffered a harm that is different from the harm suffered by the general public.142 
 
Subsection 821B(2) further clarifies the scope of the unreasonableness of the interference.143 Unreasonable 
interference constitutes conduct that “involves a significant interference with the public health, the public 
safety, the public peace, the public comfort or the public convenience.”144 The conduct could also be 
deemed unreasonable if it violated a statute, ordinance, or administrative regulation.145 Finally, the conduct 
could also be judged unreasonable if it has a continuing effect or has produced permanent or long-lasting 
damage and the actor knows or has reason to know that the conduct has a significant effect on the public 
right.146 
 
Public nuisance causes of action can be brought by public officials, private citizens, or a combination of 
the two.147 The theory of the public nuisance case is that the defendant is causing some harm to the 
                                                     
136 Id. 
 
137 Id.  
 
138 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B (1979). 
 
139 M. Stuart Madden & Gerald W. Boston, Law of Environmental and Toxic Torts 56 (3d ed., 2005). 
 
140 Id. at 57. 
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143 Restatement, supra note 138. 
 
144 Id. § 821B(2)(a). 
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community or that public health or safety is threatened.148 It is important to note that in a public nuisance 
cause of action, harm is not required and that the threat of potential harm is sufficient for the cause of action 
to move forward.149 It is also important to reiterate that the private plaintiff in a public nuisance cause of 
action must experience a harm that is different from the harm experienced by the general public.150 The 
common law application of public nuisance differs immensely from the statutory application. Under 
Minnesota law, public nuisance is a misdemeanor offense. 151  Minnesota Statutes section 609.74 
criminalizes conduct that unreasonably injures or endangers the health, safety, or morals of a considerable 
number of members of the public.152 It also criminalizes conduct that interferes with, obstructs, or endangers 
the passage of a public highway, right of way, or waters used by the public, and any conduct that violates 
a law declaring the conduct a public nuisance.153 The major difference is that common law causes of action 
focus on relief such as pecuniary damages, whereas statutory public nuisance causes of action look at 
criminal penalties. By default, this means that statutory public nuisance causes of action must be prosecuted 
by the state, whereas common law causes of action can be pursued by public officials and private 
individuals. 
 
Under the common law framework that is established in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, landowners in 
northern Minnesota could have a cause of action in public nuisance. For example, the mining companies 
polluted a nearby lake in the Superior National Forest or Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness with 
acid mine drainage effectively desecrating the aquatic life and specifically killing the sport fishing 
populations. If a resort owner on the lake files a public nuisance cause of action, an argument could be 
made that the mining company interfered with a public right. 
 
The next question is whether that interference was unreasonable. Consider the factors presented in the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 821B(2).154 Contaminating a lake with acid mine drainage to such a 
degree that killed the fish and other aquatic life would be considered a significant interference with public 
health, public safety, the public peace, the public comfort, or the public convenience. It is also possible that 
contamination to this degree would violate a local, state, or federal statute, ordinance, or administrative 
regulation. The leaching of acid mine drainage has a continuous effect or could even be permanent damage. 
It could be further argued that the mining company, based on this type of mining in other states, knew or 
should have known the mining would have a significant impact on the public right. 
 
Finally, the resort owner is the plaintiff seeking a monetary remedy. The resort suffered a particular harm 
that is different from the harm experienced by the general public. The general public may not be able to 
fish that contaminated lake. The resort owner is likely to lose business as a result of the contamination if 
people decide to go to resorts on other lakes that are not contaminated. This would likely be considered a 
special harm in the sense of a common law cause of action for public nuisance. 
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The public nuisance common law cause of action could be an effective legal measure to protect landowners 
in northern Minnesota. It would allow landowners to file public nuisance causes of action for harm to public 
resources that they may derive their business and livelihood from. The law in Minnesota is applied a little 
differently. The public nuisance statute would allow a local government or the state to prosecute the mining 
companies for damage to public land, but the misdemeanor penalties are unlikely to deter future 
contamination or even deter the mining operations before they begin. The landowners may be better served 
by pursuing action through the common law private nuisance cause of action and the state’s statutory private 
nuisance cause of action. In Hill v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., the court stated, “A nuisance may be at the 
same time both public and private, public in its general effect upon the public, and private as to those who 
suffer a special or particular damage therefrom, apart from the common injury. The public wrong must be 
redressed by a prosecution in the name of the state; the private injury by private action.” 155 
 
2. Private Nuisance 
 
Common law private nuisance is the interference with the use and enjoyment of real property that the 
plaintiff has a possessory interest in. The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 821D simply states, “A 
private nuisance is a nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of 
land.”156 The goal of the private nuisance claim is to protect the landowner’s private property rather than 
the public interest. 
 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts further explains who is liable in actions for private nuisance. It states 
that the defendant’s conduct must be the legal cause of the invasion of another person’s interest in the 
private use and enjoyment of that person’s land.157 The defendant’s invasion must also be intentional or 
unreasonable, 158  both of which require further clarification. The defendant can also be liable if the 
defendant’s conduct is the legal cause of the invasion of another person’s interest in the private use and 
enjoyment of that person’s land and that conduct violates rules controlling negligent or reckless conduct, 
or the conduct is abnormally dangerous.159  
 
According to the Restatement, the defendant’s conduct is intentional if the defendant acted with purpose 
when invading another person’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of that person’s land or the 
defendant knew that his conduct would cause the interference or was substantially certain the conduct would 
cause the interference. 160  Further, the Restatement clarifies what constitutes unreasonable intentional 
invasion. The intention is unreasonable if the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the defendant’s 
conduct.161 If the harm caused by the defendant’s conduct is serious and the financial compensation for this 
                                                     
 
155 109 N.W.2d 749, 753 (Minn. 1961). 
 
156 Restatement, supra note 138, § 821D. 
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conduct and similar conduct makes defendant’s conduct no longer feasible then it is also unreasonable.162 
 
The weighing test prescribed in the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 826(a) is further clarified in 
section 827. It suggests that in determining the gravity of harm from the defendant’s conduct, five factors 
should be considered. First, the extent of harm should be considered.163 Second, the character of harm 
should be considered.164 Third, the social value that the law attached to the type of use or enjoyment that 
has been invaded should be considered.165 Next, the suitability of the particular use or the enjoyment 
invaded to the character of the locality should be considered.166 Finally, the burden on the person harmed 
in avoiding the harm should be considered. 167These factors will help determine whether the utility of the 
sulfide mines, most notably their economic benefit, will outweigh the potential harm caused to the 
landowners. 
 
Similar to public nuisance causes of action, private nuisance causes of action have a statutory analogue. 
Minnesota law states: 
Anything which is injurious to health, or indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free 
use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, is a nuisance. An 
action may be brought by any person whose property is injuriously affected or whose personal enjoyment 
is lessened by the nuisance, and by the judgment the nuisance may be enjoined or abated, as well as damages 
recovered. 168 
This statute differs significantly from the public nuisance statute because it allows private individuals to 
bring an action and it specifically allows for injunctive and equitable relief. Minnesota case law illustrates 
how this statute has been applied 
In Citizens for a Safe Grant v. Lone Oak Sportsmen's Club, Inc.,169 the court presents a synopsis of case 
law that defines the basic scope of the private nuisance law in Minnesota. In relevant part the court states 
that “[n]uisance is defined as ‘anything which is . . . indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction 
to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property.’”170 In order 
to constitute a nuisance, the interference with the use and enjoyment must be material and substantial.171 
The standard to which the court measures discomfort is the standard to which ordinary people in the area 
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rely.172 In response to the defendant’s argument that its conduct was unintentional, the court explained that 
the statute does not contain language requiring the element of intent and instead held that the conduct 
resulting in a nuisance can be established from negligence, ultra hazardous activity, or the violation of a 
statute.173 
The court further clarified the scope of the private nuisance statute in Wendinger v. Forst Farms, Inc.174 In 
that case, the plaintiffs sued defendants because the defendants were operating a confined-animal feeding 
lot and the plaintiffs claimed that the invasive odors emanating from the feedlot constituted a nuisance.175 
In this case, the court made note that the conduct was wrongful if the conduct was the fault of the 
defendant.176 The conduct is the defendant’s fault if it is the result of intentional conduct or conduct 
resulting from negligent, reckless, or ultra hazardous activity.177 In this case, evidence of the defendant’s 
awareness that the conduct was interfering with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of the property was 
enough to establish that it was intentional conduct.178 Further clarifying the statute in Johnson v. Paynesville 
Farmers Union Co-op. Oil Co.,179 the court applied the statute and essentially adopted the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts’ test that weighs the harm to the plaintiff against the social utility of the defendant’s 
conduct. The common law action established in the Restatement (Second) of Torts seems to be a strong 
legal measure that landowners in northern Minnesota could use to protect their interests. For example, the 
mining company’s operation site leaches acid mine drainage into the landowner’s groundwater. This is 
likely to be considered an invasion of the landowner’s possessory interest in the private use or enjoyment 
of his or her land. It is likely that the conduct would be considered intentional because the mining company 
would know or have reason to know that the contamination is likely to occur based on the effect this mining 
has had in other states. 
The leaching of acid mine drainage may not be unreasonable by the definition of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts section 826 because the balancing test in section 827 may weigh in the defendant’s favor if it is 
only one landowner bringing the action.180 If the landowner works with several other landowners who are 
also negatively affected by acid mine drainage, then the weighing test could look very different. Depending 
on the number of landowners affected, the harm could be extensive. The character of the harm involved 
could be considered grave if it is a drinking water supply. It is likely that the social value of drinking water 
is extremely high and the locality rule will likely consider water and drinking water to be of great concern. 
Finally, the burden to the landowner or landowners to avoid the harm is also likely to be considered too 
burdensome. 
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The statutory cause of action is also a strong tool that landowners could use to protect themselves from 
potential damage to their property from sulfide mining pollution. Acid mine drainage could be injurious to 
landowners’ health if it is leached into groundwater. It could also interfere with the comfortable use of the 
property if it leaches into an adjacent lake and kills the fish. The affected landowner would certainly fall 
into the category of people the statute intended to bring a cause of action. Similar to section 827 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts’ balancing test, the court’s balancing test established in Johnson would need 
to be considered. It is clear that under a private nuisance cause of action, whether the action is in common 
law or under state statute, landowners would benefit by organizing several private nuisance causes of action 
in order to outweigh the economic benefit of the mines. If the court applies the balancing test, the economic 
benefits of the mines are likely to be considered a strong social utility. 
 
3. Federal Common Law Nuisance 
 
There are also common law claims under federal law; however, the federal common law nuisance claim is 
unlikely to apply to landowners in northern Minnesota affected by sulfide mining operations. In Reserve 
Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. government and the State of Minnesota jointly 
filed actions against Reserve Mining because the company was leaching asbestos-like fibers from taconite 
mining waste into Lake Superior and contaminating the drinking water for the citizens of Duluth, 
Minnesota.181 One of the claims that the government filed was a federal common law nuisance claim.182 
The court stated that while federal common law nuisance claims require pollution of interstate waters, in 
this case Lake Superior, the government was arguing that harm was only affecting the people in 
Minnesota.183 Therefore, the federal common law nuisance claim would not apply because people from 
Michigan and Wisconsin were not affected.184 The federal court did, however, defer to the state public 
nuisance law.185  
More than a decade after Reserve Mining Co., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals further limited the 
application of the federal common law nuisance claim. In National Audubon Society v. Department of 
Water, there was an action against the Los Angeles Department of Water because it had diverted four 
freshwater streams from Mono Lake to the City of Los Angeles.186 The plaintiffs raised a federal common 
law nuisance claim that the court rejected.187 The court, following the decision of the United States Supreme 
Court in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association,188 stated that the 
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more comprehensive scope of the Federal Water and Pollution Control Act superseded a federal common 
law nuisance claim and therefore the claim was denied.189 
Based on these two cases it is unlikely that landowners in northern Minnesota would be successful with a 
federal common law nuisance claim. There are several lakes in the Boundary Waters Canoe Area 
Wilderness that share a border between the United States and Canada. It is unclear whether this would 
constitute interstate waters for purposes of the federal common law, or whether the lakes would be 
considered international waters. Regardless, the land is mostly managed by the United States federal 
government and Ontario’s provincial government which would leave the landowners largely absent from 
any legal proceedings. Furthermore, the court’s subsequent ruling in National Audubon Society v. 
Department of Water clearly established that in the case of federal common law claims regarding water, 
federal water policy supersedes and would render the federal common law nuisance claim inapplicable. The 
landowners in northern Minnesota would be more successful filing a claim under state law.
 
V. Conclusion
 
There are a number of laws attempting to address environmental harms at the state and federal level. 
Generally, these laws are written expansively in order to apply to the broadest number of possible 
environmental harms. The question of whether these laws are adequate for landowners in northern 
Minnesota or whether they are inadequate is not simple. A lot of the laws’ effectiveness is dependent on 
how the mining companies conduct their operations, how the landowners are affected, and how landowners 
who have been harmed want to pursue legal action. It is sufficed to say that some of these laws are helpful 
in protecting landowners’ property while others are less helpful. 
The environmental statutes at the state and federal level are not adequately designed to provide 
compensatory damages to individuals who experience environmental harms resulting from large-scale 
industrial operations. The federal statutes provide no compensatory damages, while the Minnesota 
Environmental Rights Act only provides for damages when the project is not permitted by one of the state 
agencies. This means that, at the state level, compensatory damages can be sought in actions against a 
company responsible for an environmental harm that has not completed a state agency’s review process. If 
a company has completed the requisite review process for its project and receives a permit to operate, the 
company effectively becomes exempt from claims under MERA. The only recourse for private landowners 
would be to file suit against the agency that permitted the project. The relief is likely to be limited to 
enjoinment of the mining operations. 
Injunctive relief is the best relief that the environmental statutory causes of action can provide. While 
injunctive relief would be an exceptional outcome to a sulfide mining project that is causing grave 
environmental harm, it does little to help a landowner whose land is damaged, or to the business owner who 
suffers a loss of business due to the contamination of the land or water. 
The common law actions are likely to be the most beneficial when considering compensation for 
environmental harms to landowners’ property. However, the codified versions in Minnesota law and court 
interpretations are not necessarily the most useful. It is difficult to determine whether the Minnesota 
Supreme Court would consider acid mine drainage to be an invasion of a landowner’s property for an action 
in trespass. Arguments could be made either way on whether acid mine drainage constitutes particulate 
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matter. It would be advantageous for the landowners pursing any cause of action to pair an action in trespass 
with it. 
The public nuisance statute that criminalizes a public nuisance completely strips the effectiveness of the 
common law public nuisance cause of action. The common law cause of action in public nuisance would 
specifically allow landowners who are negatively impacted by acid mine drainage to bring a cause of action 
individually and on behalf of the public who use the land and water. In addition, public officials can bring 
the cause of action and can do so in conjunction with private landowners. The statutory public nuisance 
cause of action limits the government to prosecuting the polluter for a misdemeanor offense. In contrast, 
the common law private nuisance cause of action and the codified version in Minnesota law could both be 
effective tools for the landowners whose property has been damaged by the sulfide mining operations. The 
main issue is that the balancing test required by the Restatement (Second) of Torts and the court’s adoption 
of a similar test would require the landowners to work together in a class action style law suit in order to 
demonstrate that environmental harm to the landowners’ property outweighs harm to the mining company’s 
and the region’s economic interest. 
Again, the effectiveness of these statutory and common law causes of action depends largely on what 
happens in the future. All of the laws allow some sort of injunctive relief which is a large part of limiting 
the environmental harm that these mines could potentially inflict. Injunctive relief, however, falls short of 
repairing a tourism industry that is reliant upon the pristine wilderness of northern Minnesota when that 
wilderness has been contaminated. Lawmakers in St. Paul could work with landowners in northern 
Minnesota to strengthen existing laws to ensure that they can protect the landowners and the environment 
from the potential type of damage to land and water that sulfide mines have been responsible for in other 
states. 
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